Eco-entrepreneurs in developing countries are often subject to market or institutional constraints, e.g. via credit rationing or missing markets. Conservation interventions which relax constraints may be both cost-e¤ective and poverty reducing. A simulation using data from an intervention in Madagascar to relax the technological constraints of forest honey production investigates this possibility. Cost-e¤ectively achieving dual environment-development goals is shown to depend on the severity of constraints, relative prices and, importantly, the nature of technology. Success is more likely for technologies exhibiting close to constant returns to scale or high input complementarity. Forest honey does not meet these requirements, whereas sustainable forest management may well do. Ultimately, where market or institutional constraints are present, knowledge of the recipient technology is required for more informed, e¢ cient and perhaps, more politically-acceptable conservation policy.
Cost-e¤ectiveness is also shown to be highly dependent on the features of production, particularly returns to scale and input complementarity. A discussion follows about other production settings in which our innovative method of characterising the constraint might be applied, which include sustainable forest management (SFM), shade co¤ee production or where in situ technical expertise is missing.
The results are important because contrary to the perfect market and institutional setting of Ferraro and Simpson (2002) , constraints, institutional failures and market failures are the rule rather than the exception in many developing countries (Ellis, 1998; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2005) .
Therefore, providing credit, expertise and technology, or more secure land rights in such settings might be more cost-e¤ective interventions for increasing forest cover compared with the use of …nancial incentives such as PES. Our results also indicate that the evaluation of cost-e¤ectiveness is not su¢ cient to evaluate the desirability of the programme. In a constrained world, e¢ ciency and distributional issues are also important determinants of success (FAO, 2010) .
The paper proceeds as follows. From Ferraro and Simpson (2002) and Groom and Palmer (2010) , we …rst restate the conditions necessary for e¢ ciency, cost-e¤ectiveness to the donor and the impact on the eco-entrepreneur's pro…ts, in Section 2. The model is then calibrated for forest honey producers using data collected from Madagascar, in Section 3. We develop a method of de…ning the technological constraint and assessing the policy that was implemented to relax this.
In Section 4, we present our results, including a comparison with those of Ferraro and Simpson (2002) . Following from a sensitivity analysis in Section 5, Section 6 discusses the implications of the results, in particular focusing on the broader applicability of our method to de…ne and measure technological constraints, i.e. in other settings.
eco-entrepreneur
We begin by summarising the theoretical conditions for e¢ ciency, cost-e¤ectiveness to the donor and the impact on the eco-entrepreneur's pro…ts (or income) of conserving forest either indirectly via the expansion of a joint production activity or directly via payments for forest land. These conditions form the basis for the empirical simulation. Groom and Palmer (2010) extended Ferraro and Simpson (2002) to develop these conditions for a pro…t-maximising yet input-constrained producer with concave production function Q = F (K; F ) using capital (K) and forest (F ) as inputs. Prices for output, Q; and inputs are given by P Q , P K and P F , respectively. Market and institutional imperfections are introduced via the presence of a binding constraint on capital, K. The conditions follow from the comparative statics of the constrained pro…t function, in contrast to the unconstrained case analysed by Ferraro and Simpson (2002) . In particular, when input (output) markets are constrained and rationing by quantity occurs, the relevant decision price for the entrepreneur is no longer the market price P K but the higher (lower) 'virtual'price, P v : Hence, a constraint rent exists, P v P K , which measures the value of relaxing the constraint. Groom and Palmer (2010) provide the technical details for both input and output constraints.
E¢ ciency
E¢ ciency is evaluated by comparing the e¢ ciency losses and gains associated with relaxing constraints with those of paying for the conservation of forest land through a PES scheme. The latter payment is given by dP F . For an eco-entrepreneur facing a capital constraint K; where the unit resource cost of relaxing the constraint is the underlying market price P K , forest-land payments are more e¢ cient if:
where dC is the incremental cost of relaxing constraints compared to forest-land payments, dK is the amount of capital required to increase forest land, and P 0 v is the initial virtual price of capital. 1 The term dP I v is the change in the virtual price of capital as a consequence of relaxing the constraint on capital while dP D v is the change in the virtual price of capital as a consequence of the forest-land payment. Given the assumptions, the former is negative and the latter is positive. The second term is the constraint rent associated with relaxing the constraint, and is positive. Hence, the sign of dC, and the relative e¢ ciency of the two policies is indeterminate.
The donor' s preferred policy
The donor must either pay F dP F , directly for forest land, or P K dK under the policy of relaxing constraints. A donor concerned solely with cost-e¤ectiveness prefers payments if:
This condition becomes:
where C ij is the constrained elasticity of demand for input i with respect to the price of input j, and U ij is the unconstrained equivalent. This reveals the dependence on features of the technology:
the virtual price elasticity of demand for capital, U KK ; the constraint rent associated with the constraint, P 0 v P K ; the unconstrained cross-price elasticity of inputs, U KF ; and, the constrained own-price elasticity of demand for forest land, C F F . Super…cially, condition (3) states that the donor prefers forest payments rather relaxing constraints when: the constraint rent is low; the demand for forest is inelastic with respect to price; and, capital and forests are highly complementary (high U KF ): In reality, the condition is more complicated since the virtual price P v depends on the elasticities.
Hence, if the donor pays the resource cost of relaxing the constraint, the eco-entrepreneur prefers a payment for forest land if:
This shows that when the demand for forest land and capital are highly complementarity, in the sense of there being a large, positive, unconstrained cross-price elasticity, U KF ; and where the constrained own-price elasticity of forest, C F F , is inelastic, then the eco-entrepreneur will prefer to participate in PES since it requires a larger payment. It is in direct tension with condition (3) for the donor.
However, despite this tension, when the constraint rent is positive, P 0 v > P K , conditions (2) and (4) can hold simultaneously in favour of relaxing constraints so that both the donor and eco-entrepreneur will prefer this. The area of agreement is large whenever the constraint rent is large, i.e. due to a high, positive value of P 0 v . Relaxing constraints can, in principle, provide cost-e¤ective conservation of forest land for the donor while also providing a large transfer to the eco-entrepreneur through the released constraint rent. Once again, since the virtual price, P v ; depends on the elasticities in condition (3) and (5), more investigation is required to illustrate which intervention is preferred and under what circumstances.
In summary, given the technological assumptions three outcomes are possible depending on the cost of the intervention: i) donors prefer forest-land payments through a PES scheme and producers prefer relaxation of constraints; ii) both parties prefer relaxation of constraints; iii) donors prefer relaxing constraints and eco-entrepreneurs prefer PES. While Ferraro and Simpson's (2002) Honey producing households reside in poor, resource-dependent communities located at the edge of a bio-diverse rich, dry forest. Preserving biodiversity in the area, including a number of endemic and currently endangered animal species, is one of the greatest ecological challenges that Madagascar faces (Nicoll, 2003) . Deforestation via slash-and-burn agriculture occurs at an annual rate of 1 percent (Scales, 2007) .
Numerous NGOs, both local and international, and donors alike operate in the region primarily (but not necessarily exclusively) to conserve biodiversity. For example, the Durrell Wildlife Trust has been experimenting with an environmental auction among local communities to participate in biodiversity monitoring. Conservation payments were paid out to the 'winners'of the auction. In our study area, NGOs have been considering various interventions including PES and eco-tourism as a means of raising incomes and conserving forest (Dirac, 2009 than the traditional ones with honey produced on 'cadres' inside, which need to be periodically removed and the honey gathered (Dirac, personal communication) .
To calibrate the model we use primary data on agricultural activities and non-timber forest Honey production requires forest land as an input. Indeed, honey yield has been found to increase with proximity to forest (see Sande et al., 2009) . It also requires labour and capital inputs more or less in …xed proportions. In principle, therefore, a donor wishing to conserve forests could purchase forest land or capital inputs. Both would simultaneously enhance honey production while employing more forest land in production.
Calibration of constrained honey production 3.2.1 The technology
Ferraro and Simpson (2002) characterise the semi-modern technology of honey production in Madagascar. Given our limited data, we return to their characterisation of the following Cobb-Douglas production function: Q = AK F , where Q is honey production, A is a productivity parameter, and are the elasticities of capital and forest, respectively, K and F . Due to gaps in our own data, we utilise the following parameter values estimated by Ferraro and Simpson (ibid) . The technology has strong diminishing returns to scale in that = 0:36 and = 0:15, with A = 48.
In addition, and re ‡ect a low output elasticity of capital, K, and particularly forest, F . This deterministically captures the low complementarity between F and K and the loose relationship between honey production and forests that might arise from non-rivalry.
The constraint and behavioural assumptions
Our data contain no explicit de…nition of the individual constraints faced by honey producers.
Nevertheless, the presence of two types of beehive in the sample, semi-modern and traditional, allows us to identify and characterise the production constraint when combined with assumptions concerning the production technology. In particular, semi-modern beehives are twice as productive as traditional ones, and are only used by recipients of assistance from NGOs working in the area.
This provides a prima facie case for the existence of a technological constraint underpinned by a capital constraint, which is being relaxed by external donor intervention. We characterise the constraint as follows.
We …rst de…ne the traditional technology as being a nested version of the semi-modern technology, di¤ering only in the e¤ective capital embodied in each beehive. Thus, we de…ne the technology in terms of e¤ective capital EK: Q = A (EK) F , where E = 1 for the traditional technology, and E > 1 for the semi-modern technology. K represents the number of beehives and E represents the di¤erences in the construction of traditional and semi-modern. EK can be understood as the interior surface area for honey production. 5 Characterising the technology in this way allows us to represent the traditional technology as a capital-constrained version of the semi-modern technology.
In what follows, we calibrate the values of E and K.
We assume that both traditional and semi-modern producers are pro…t maximisers conditional on their own technology and the associated prices. This de…nes supply functions: Q T (P T K ; P F ; E T = 1) and Q SM P SM K ; P F ; E SM , for each technology. These di¤er only because of the values of the parameter E and the price of traditional and semi-modern beehives, P T K and P SM K , respectively.
To de…ne the parameter E for semi-modern producers we use the observation that the pro…t-maximising output of traditional production is approximately half that of unconstrained semimodern production: Q SM = 2Q T . This leads to the following de…nition of E SM :
With E SM de…ned, it is then possible to de…ne the e¤ective capital constraint, K, faced by traditional producers in terms of the semi-modern technology:
The implication of (6) and (7) is that
is, unconstrained traditional producers are modelled as constrained semi-modern producers.
The assumptions underlying our method of characterising the capital constraint have the following implications. Both the traditional and the constrained semi-modern producers have constrained supply curves (Q) and constrained demand curves for forest, F C (:) ; that are identical in P F space.
However, the demand for e¤ective capital di¤ers between these two technologies, with the latent demand for e¤ective capital much higher for semi-modern capital due to its higher productivity.
Relaxing the capital constraint assumes that the honey producer is assisted in shifting from one technology to another as additional semi-modern hives are provided as part of the policy approach.
Thus, the impact of this approach is analysed along the semi-modern demand curve rather than the traditional.
There are two possible constrained scenarios when considering forest-land payments. First, a partially-constrained analysis in which payments induce additional traditional hives to be employed,
Second, a totally-constrained scenario in which capital remains constrained at K. We compare both scenarios to relaxing the constraint, K, with semi-modern capital.
De…ning the constraint: The constrained and unconstrained solutions
We use the following parameter values from the data for the simulation: [ ; ; A; P SM K ; P T K ; P Q ; 0:36; 0:15; 48; 24; 8; 3; 2] . Table 1 shows the solutions to the traditional technology, the semi-modern and the constrained semi-modern technologies.
[ Solving for E SM using (6) leads to E SM = 7:7. The semi-modern technology, with its greater e¤ective capital, produces greater quantities and pro…ts while using more forest with fewer beehives.
Using (7) to solve for the capital constraint yields: K = 2:4. This re ‡ects the 'e¤ective' capital constraint faced by producers using traditional technology in terms of the semi-modern technology, as seen in the semi-modern constrained scenario in row three of Table 1 . 6 The simulation has two parts. First, we estimate the forest payment, dP F , and the amount of capital, dK, required to increase forest. We follow Ferraro and Simpson (2002) in analysing the cost of the intervention required to e¤ect a 0.1 ha change in forest for a single producer, assuming that ten producers are subject to the intervention. We estimate forest-land payments for the two possible constrained scenarios described above, partial and total. Second, we undertake a comparison of these results to the case where market conditions are ignored. That is, where it is assumed that the producer is unconstrained and responds to payments, either to forest land or capital, dP F and dP K . In all cases we treat both capital and forest-land inputs as a ‡ow despite the potential for capital to be a one-o¤ intervention.
4 Results: forest payments vs relaxation of the constraint
What is e¢ cient?
The e¢ cient intervention is determined by condition (1). If the incremental cost, dC, is negative then the honey producer prefers constraints to be relaxed. 7 Given the technological assumptions this condition holds and the e¢ cient intervention, i.e. that which generates the greatest aggregate bene…t, is for constraints to be relaxed. 8 Table 2 details the impact of the interventions. In the totally-constrained case, the deadweight loss when constraints are relaxed is US$ 3:2 compared to one of US$ 0:35 when a forest-land payment is made. However, there is a large e¢ ciency gain as a consequence of relaxing the constraint, which is measured by the released constraint rent of US$ 26:4. The incremental cost of employing a payment rather than relaxing the capital constraint in this case is therefore US$ 23:6:
In e¤ect, the donor's contributions release extra resources which contribute both to the environmental objective and the welfare of the producer and hence, could improve the latter. But if the donor is concerned only with the much narrower objective of cost-e¤ectiveness, then it will prefer forest payments to supplying capital inputs, as shown below.
What the donor prefers
The donor's preferences are determined by equation (3). With the decreasing returns to scale (DRS) technology of honey production this condition becomes:
That is, the donor prefers to make a forest-land payment if the 'augmented' constraint rent, P 0 v P K is less than zero, which is the case with the parameter values used here. 9 Table 2 shows the implications for the producer's pro…ts and donor's costs in both the partially-and totally-constrained cases. In the latter, US$ 6:17 is required to induce an increase of 0.1 ha. Since the donor must pay for all units of forest employed, on average 0:98 ha, not just the marginal units, the total cost per producer is:
responsive and the cost to the donor is reduced to US$ 54:3. Re ‡ecting equation (3), this shows that forest-land payments become less cost-e¤ective the more constrained the honey producer. 
What the honey producer prefers
The honey producer's preferences are determined by the inequality shown in (4). With the DRS technology he will prefer the intervention to relax constraints if < 1, which is clearly the case since = 0:15. Table 2 shows the implications for the producer's pro…ts and the donor's costs in both the partially-and totally-constrained scenarios. The increase in pro…ts from the forestland payment is only US$ 5.1 or US$ 5.7 in these respective scenarios. While these payments are increasingly desirable to the producer when it is more constrained, the impact on pro…t should be compared to a change of over US$ 40 when constraints are relaxed. A signi…cant portion of the latter is the released constraint rent P 0 v P SM K dK , which is indicated by dCR in Table 2 In summary, when considering market conditions for the case of Malagasy honey producers, the preferences of the donor and the producer remain in tension regardless of whether the producer can adjust traditional capital or not. This …nding accords with Ferraro and Simpson (2002) who ignored market conditions. Hence, even where honey producers are technologically constrained, conservation and income objectives remain in tension from the perspective of the donor: the coste¤ective strategy does not induce the greatest transfer to the producer.
What if we ignore market conditions?
The lower part of Table 2 shows the results when honey producers are assumed to be unconstrained pro…t maximisers. We analyse the response of an unconstrained semi-modern producer to forest payments or subsidies to capital, rather than relaxing capital constraints. As well as placing donor and producer in tension, ignoring market conditions makes these transfers look more cost-e¤ective than they actually are. This can be seen in the underestimation of the costs to the donor of US$ 53.9 rather than US$ 60.5 per ha of conserved forest for a totally-constrained producer. On the other hand, the bene…ts to producers are underestimated: US$ 5.2 instead of US$ 5.7.
Sensitivity analysis
In the case of Madagascar the donor prefers payments for forest land even when market conditions are considered. The producer, on the other hand, prefers capital constraints to be relaxed. The e¢ cient course of action is to relax constraints in honey production. As the following sensitivity analysis now illustrates, these results are sensitive to the nature of the joint production technology as well as the relative prices of inputs and outputs.
We focus on parameters that describe the Cobb-Douglas technology: , and the returns to scale k = + , and restrict attention to the more plausible decreasing returns to scale case (DRS).
In the DRS case the conditions under which the donor and eco-entrepreneur both prefer to relax constraints (conditions (2) and (4), respectively) can be combined to yield P 0 v > P 0 v > P K (Groom and Palmer, 2009 ): The …rst inequality shows that in most circumstances the eco-entrepreneur will prefer constraints to be relaxed, since it requires < 1. This leaves two of the possible outcomes outlined in Section 2.3: either the donor prefers the forest payment and the eco-entrepreneur prefers relaxing constraints, or both agree on relaxing constraints. Whether or not tension exists between the agents on the appropriate intervention depends on the donor's preferences. In the Cobb-Douglas case the donor prefers to relax constraints if the augmented constraint rent is positive:
The augmented constraint rent is closely related to the constraint rent P 0 v P K ; which conditions (2) and (4) production, the donor will prefer to relax constraints because only small increments of capital are required to achieve an increase in forest conservation. Second, large and indicates higher returns to scale. Figure 1 shows that the closer technology is to constant returns to scale (CRS) the more likely it is that the donor will prefer relaxing constraints to forest-land payments. In sum, increased complementarity and higher returns to scale increase the augmented constraint rent and make relaxing constraints more favourable. 14 Fixing returns to scale such that + = k reveals that intermediate, rather than extreme, values of and are more likely to lead to the relaxation of constraints being preferred by donors.
In the Cobb-Douglas case a general interpretation of this observation is that donors are less likely to prefer to relax constraints where technologies are either highly capital or forest intensive. This re ‡ects the tradeo¤ between complementarity, forest-price elasticity and other determinants of the augmented constraint rent. For instance, holding returns to scale …xed, an increase in towards extreme values simultaneously decreases complementarity and increases the price elasticity of demand for forest C F F = 1= ( 1) thus making forest-land payments preferable to the ecoentrepreneur. Furthermore, although high values of increase complementarity, when returns to scale are held constant the augmented constraint rent eventually declines as diminishes. Figure   2 in the appendix shows that the precise relationship depends on relative prices.
The parameter values for forest honey production are indicated in Figure 1 . Here, returns to scale are strongly decreasing since k = + = 0:51. Complementarity between forest and capital is low since and are small: = ( 1) = 0:42: The constrained price elasticity of forest demand, on the other hand, is relatively large, at 1:56. Ultimately, the donor prefers forest-land payments, and there are no values of and such that the donor would prefer to relax constraints at the existing returns to scale.
Similar results hold when one abstracts from the individual agents and considers overall e¢ -ciency (Equation 1). In Figure 1 the lower curved line plots values of and for which forest-land payments and relaxing constraints are equally e¢ cient. Above the line relaxing constraints is ef…cient and the range of values for which this is the case is larger and includes honey production.
This re ‡ects the fact that the full welfare e¤ect includes the released constraint rent over and above any payments. Hence if a Coasian bargain over the constraint rent could be struck between donor and eco-entrepreneur then the donor might be persuaded to opt for relaxing constraints.
Discussion and conclusions
In addressing the cost-e¤ectiveness of conservation payments, Ferraro and Simpson (2002) abstracted from the important fact that there are likely to be multiple market failures in developing world conservation-related enterprises. Their …nding that direct approaches to conservation are much more cost-e¤ective than indirect approaches is therefore suspect. In this paper we investigate empirically the market and institutional conditions under which di¤erent policy interventions to in-duce forest conservation are e¢ cient, cost-e¤ective and agreed upon by donor and eco-entrepreneur alike. Identifying these conditions may assist in choice of policy instrument in constrained market and institutional settings, and indicate when dual environmental and income-enhancing goals are likely to be achieved via conservation payments.
The main …nding in relation to honey production in Madagascar is that relaxing constraints is unlikely to be cost-e¤ective for the donor, despite a clear technological constraint. Stark decreasing returns to scale and weak relationships between capital and forest inputs tend to favour payments to conserve forest land despite the severity of the constraint. This result is strengthened when one considers what is left out of the production analysis. For example, the link between capital and forest might be weaker still considering the public good nature of forests, to the extent that this is not re ‡ected in the DRS technology. The honey producer, however, prefers technological constraints to be relaxed due to the transfer of constraint rents. Without side payments the two actors prefer di¤erent interventions and hence environmental and income-generation objectives are in tension. Such tensions can be detrimental to the success of conservation schemes (FAO, 2009 ).
Nonetheless, even in the case of forest honey production relaxing constraints generates an overall welfare gain since the released constraint rent is larger than any deadweight loss. Hence, relaxing constraints could be preferred by both parties (Pareto improving) if side payments/matching funds (lower P K ) or some other form of Coasian bargain were possible. Alternatively, if the donor factors in e¢ ciency gains, i.e. both environmental and development goals, into its objective then again, the two objectives could be achieved simultaneously. This might be the case, for example, for donors looking to include poverty alleviation as a 'co-bene…t'of policy to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD).
Our conclusion in relation to honey production accords with Ferraro and Simpson (2002) in the sense that the donor will not favour indirect conservation schemes. Yet, this comes at the cost of overall e¢ ciency. Our analysis of relaxing market/institutional constraints can be applied to other joint production activities. Of particular relevance is the characterisation of relaxing constraints as the provision of input-augmenting technological change. For instance, one of the main constraints to sustainable forest management (SFM) and agro-forestry activities such as shade co¤ee production is technical capacity (FAO, 2009 Another technological constraint to the speci…c example of SFM concerns capital in the form of monitoring and veri…cation technologies. These have also been the subject of donor intervention, e.g. in Ecuador. Although not technological, credit rationing is also a constraint to SFM, which has high initial costs of tree-planting. Similarly, credit constraints were found to be a major cause of the abandonment of shade co¤ee plantations in Mexico (see Blackman et al., 2005) . Financial instruments such as forestry funds and environmental bond guarantees could help relax these constraints (FAO, 2009 ). Our analysis shows that such interventions could be cost-e¤ective.
More generally, Groom and Palmer (2009) show that there is a symmetric problem in which relaxing constraints can reduce input use in activities which degrade or convert forest, such as agriculture. A typical example is o¤-farm labour constraints, which can reduce on-farm labour and land use if these inputs are complementary. Not only are such constraints commonplace, but input complementarity in this context is arguably more plausible than in the case of an ecoentrepreneur.
Marchand (2010) and found such agricultural technologies in the Brazilian Amazon and China, respectively. Constant returns to scale are also more likely in such cases (e.g. Cornia, 1985; Marchand, 2010) .
The idea of relaxing constraints to o¤-farm activities in order to induce cost-e¤ective forest conservation has also been examined in numerous studies. O¤-farm labour constraints, such as those documented in Nepal, the Phillipines, and China (e.g. Blu¤stone 1995; Shively and Pagiola, 2004; Grosjean and Kontoleon, 2009 ) arise due to involuntary unemployment, weak land tenure and missing property rights, and institutional constraints to mobility, e.g. the Hukou system in China. 15 Relaxing such constraints may achieve dual environmental and income-generating objectives. For example, in the Sloping Lands Conversion Programme (SLCP), the relaxation of liquidity and o¤-farm labour market constraints succeeded in both reducing poverty and providing environmental bene…ts (Gauvin et al., 2009; Uchida et al., 2009 ). Shively and Pagiola (2004) This issue of fungibility speaks to the broader issue of monitoring and enforcement, which a¤ects both types of intervention considered. Lastly, while we have been able to characterise and quantify the constraint in the case of honey production, relaxing some of the other constraints discussed is often more di¢ cult. Governments' attempts to relaxing credit constraints or improve market access, for instance, have not always led to welfare improvements.
Ultimately, reaching dual policy goals suggests a need for targeting not only with respect to choice of technology but also with respect to space. While macro-level studies suggest a direct correlation between poverty and environment (see Sachs et al., 2009 ), micro-level evidence suggests that policies such as PES are not necessarily bene…ting the poor for various reasons including the presence of market and institutional constraints (see Engel et al., 2008 3 A household in the study area cultivates an average of 1.86 hectares (ha) per year, typically rice, maize, cassava and peanuts. 4 For example, during this time, 288 household questionnaires on local agricultural production were undertaken in six villages, while another survey comprising a further 70 questionnaires were carried out in regional markets. Further qualitative interviews were undertaken in four villages to obtain detailed information about beekeeping.
5 Bradbear (2009) describes this as one major distinction between the traditional and semi-traditional technologies, alongside the need for training to use the latter. 6 In e¤ect, by determining E M = 7:7 we have determined that K = K T =7:7 = 2:4: We could have determined the constraint on the basis of equating pro…ts between traditional and constrained semi-modern production. Not only is this not what we observe but this makes the constraint even more severe and hence, tips the balance even more in favour of relaxing constraints.
7 Groom and Palmer (2010) show that this condition can be re-written as: PK < are the shadow prices of capital after relaxing constraints and paying for forest land, respectively. 8 The expression for the shadow price Pv is given by:
; which is used to evaluate P is US$ 37:7. Under forest-land payments this increases to US$ 38:7 as the virtual price increases. Otherwise the constraint is relaxed and the constraint rent declines to US$ 29:2.
1 3 The constrained demand for forest is F C = P F P Q A K 1 4 Our result concerning returns to scale will hold for homogenous technologies because the value of marginal productivity is increasing in the degree of homogeneity/returns to scale, k (see Groom and Palmer, 2009 Eq 7 (Pk = 8)
Eq 7 (Pk = 1) Honey Production
Figure 2: Donor's preferences over price intervention and relaxing constraints: dependence on and and the price of capital (P K ).
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